

O 221223Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7586
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 001017

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UKRAINIAN PROPOSAL AND B-1, NOVEMBER 20, 2008

REF: A. GENEVA 0998 (JCIC-XXXIII-015)
[¶](#)B. GENEVA 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

[¶](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-020.

[¶](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 20, 2008
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[¶](#)3. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on November 20, 2008, to discuss the Ukrainian proposal on converting eliminated ICBMs to formerly declared types of ICBMs and Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States were represented.

[¶](#)4. (S) The Ukrainian Delegation offered to answer questions on their proposal to change the designation of existing types of ICBMs which have been completely eliminated to the category of former types of ICBMs under the START Treaty. The U.S. and Russian Delegations sought clarifications on the benefits to the proposed change. The U.S. Delegation stated that a detailed analysis was needed during the intersession to further discuss the issue.

[¶](#)5. (S) The U.S. and Russian sides discussed their respective views regarding the conversion of the B-1B from a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range nuclear air launched cruise missiles (LRNAs) into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The U.S. Delegation explained the U.S. view was that the conversion

should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear armaments so that such armaments could not be "operationally deployed." The Russian Delegation explained that "operational deployment" was not in the Treaty and stated that they would study the U.S.-Proposed JCIC Joint Statement to facilitate resolution at the next session.

HIT ME WITH YOUR BEST SHOT

¶ 6. (S) At a WG Meeting on November 20, 2008, Comeau said that the Ukrainian Delegation had introduced a proposal at the Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting on November 18, 2008 (Ref A), to change the designation of SS-24 and SS-17 ICBMs to former types as defined under the START Treaty. Comeau asked whether the Ukrainian Delegation could provide any further explanation of the proposal. Shevtsov began by saying he had provided text reflecting this proposal. He solicited comments and preliminary reactions from the Parties present and promised to answer right away if possible or later after study, if the questions were more in-depth.

¶ 7. (S) Comeau asked the Ukrainian Delegation three clarifying questions about its proposal: 1) Did Ukraine intend to reference the SS-17 ICBM as a former type in its proposal; 2) What benefit would be realized in re-designating the eliminated types of ICBMs as former types of ICBMs; and finally 3) What the link was between eliminated types and former types?

¶ 8. (S) Shevtsov confirmed the SS-17 was a correct reference because even though it was never deployed it was produced at the "Uzhmash" plant, and therefore, it would be useful to include the SS-17 with the SS-24. He added that each Party could determine for themselves their non-deployed missiles to add to the list of former types, noting that he could have included more types that had been produced in Ukraine, but since those types are being used by Russia, Ukraine decided against doing that.

¶ 9. (S) Shevtsov clarified that the main idea was to have an updated list of existing types and mentioned that Ukraine would not be converting one type of ICBM to another; he did not want to change the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Protocol. He continued that Ukraine did not want to change its program with the United States, stressing that what was left was listed as non-deployed but in fact they were just solid rocket motors that Ukraine wanted to finish the process and eliminate them. He said that even once they are destroyed they could be considered "former types."

¶ 10. (S) Kuehne noted that the Ukrainian paper had stated that the Treaty did not apply to former types of ICBMs. He noted, however, that under certain circumstances the Treaty did apply to former types, for example, as in Paragraph 6 of Article X concerning telemetry. Kuehne said the United States would have to look at the proposal and carefully analyze its impact on the Treaty.

¶ 11. (S) Shevtsov agreed that Ukraine still needed to conduct a thorough analysis and hoped that such an analysis would help to resolve the issues.

¶ 12. (S) Ryzhkov said he wanted to understand why Ukraine believed it could re-designate missiles as former types, specifically the SS-24 and SS-17. Referring to the definition of "former type" in the Definitions Annex, he stated that both these ICBMs were deployed at the time of entry into force (EIF), and asked whether the Ukrainian position was that the definition should be changed. He noted that there were types of ICBMs that were deployed in both Russia and Ukraine, so, before the JCIC attempted to reach consensus on the Ukrainian proposal, he suggested a bilateral meeting with Ukraine to reach an understanding of the proposal and its effect on ICBMs which were both deployed in Russia and Ukraine at EIF of the Treaty.

¶13. (S) Shevtsov explained that Ukraine had not intended to provide another definition of former type, but wanted to provide another understanding of the term. Concerning the SS-17, he indicated that it was important to specify when they were deployed, and he did not believe that any such missiles were produced after EIF. He agreed that it would be good to meet with Russia bilaterally to discuss the issue further.

EURO HEART BREAKER (HB) - B-1

¶14. (S) Ryzhkov opened the discussion on the B-1 heavy bomber conversion by stating that his comments were very preliminary as there had not been much time to study the U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement (Ref B). He believed that the United States understood the basic Russian concern of converting the B-1 in a manner that ensured that it was incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. He said that he suspected the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber, taken from external observation, was "notional" ("uslovnyy kharakter" in Russian). He brought up comments previously made by Shevtsov about a "process equivalent to welding" and previous conversion techniques for pylons to demonstrate his point.

¶15. (S) Ryzhkov addressed the U.S.-proposed Joint Statement stating it introduced a new concept - "operational deployment." Russia believed there were technical aspects regarding conversion that needed to be addressed, and that the notion of "operational deployment" was an abstract concept and that without technical characteristics it would hardly address Russian concerns. He stated that he did not see how the measures taken conformed to the final objective of the conversion, and proposed that the sides develop an approach similar to what Russia did with respect to the SS-25 RVOSI: it is up to the inspected Party to remove the concerns of the inspecting Party. He summarized the Russian position by stating that what is needed are technical characteristics that would determine whether the aircraft is or is not capable, and only this would be sufficiently convincing.

¶16. (S) Shevtsov added that he also did not like the phrase "operational deployment" in this context.

¶17. (S) Comeau tried to clarify the concepts of operational capability, deployment and delivery as it related to the ability to carry nuclear armaments in a converted B-1 and requested from Ryzhkov the precise Treaty reference to "irreversibility," a concept that the Russians had raised earlier in the session. Comeau also stated that he was aware that the Treaty was old and did not include the concept of operational deployment. However, the operational deployment concept was inherent in the fact that the Treaty allowed for the conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA to the category of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

¶18. (S) Ryzhkov insisted that the United States must provide proof, based on technical characteristics, that the B-1 heavy bomber could not carry nuclear weapons. He conceded it was a complex issue and acknowledged that one can equip anything, with anything, given enough money and resources, but that merely "transporting" a nuclear weapon on a civilian aircraft, for example, was not enough to consider that aircraft "capable of carrying" nuclear weapons. Comeau said that this was how the phrase "operationally deployed" should be understood: the civilian aircraft could not operationally deploy the nuclear weapon, and asked whether the word "delivery" would assist in the Russian understanding of this concept.

¶19. (S) Ryzhkov said that he did not question the right of the United States to decide on how to do the conversion. All the United States had to do was convince the other side that this type of heavy bomber is incapable of carrying nuclear weapons. Concerning the earlier Russian comment about

"irreversibility," he said that what he meant to say was that any re-conversion would have to be done as provided for in the Treaty. (Begin Comment: The impression of the U.S. Delegation was that Ryzhkov was falling off the concept that the conversion process must be irreversible. End Comment.)

¶20. (S) Comeau introduced again the idea of a civilian aircraft that was large enough to load a nuclear weapon but did not have the ability to use it operationally. Ryzhkov agreed that without a technical conversion, one could not load a missile and release it, because specialized equipment was needed. He repeated the Russian concern as being that the B-1 can carry nuclear weapons even after the conversion, and Russia needed to know that this was not possible. Claiming that the United States must have some additional information available, he referred back to the heavy bomber distinguishability exhibition and asked why the United States did not show the Russian experts a converted heavy bomber beside one that had not been converted, because without that comparison the Russian experts could not see the incompatibility between the two. Ryzhkov added that this would have been the simplest way, had this been done.

TAKIN' IT BACK

¶21. (S) After the meeting, Smith conducted a side bar discussion with Ryzhkov and Kuz'min about the B-52 Data Update Inspections at Davis-Monthan CorE facility. He asked if it would be helpful to the Russian Federation if the United States made a unilateral statement during the closing plenary concerning the status of the B-52 heavy bombers located at Davis-Monthan. Specifically, that as a result of the heavy bombers going through an ageing and surveillance process, they were in various stages of disassembly yet were still able to be inspected in accordance with Joint Statement 10 of the Treaty. Smith believed that perhaps this would help clarify to all the Parties that these bombers were in a special status and were not being eliminated.

¶22. (S) Ryzhkov stated that although he had not cleared this idea with his delegation, he believed it may help. Ryzhkov said that he and Kuz'min had discussed something like this between themselves and were trying to decide what the best format might be. He stated that a unilateral statement would be an appropriate format.

¶23. (U) Documents exchanged: None

¶24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Lt Col Comeau
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
Mr. Smith
Mr. Yaguchi
Mr. French (Int)

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin
Mr. Kasenov

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Ms. Kotkova

Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Mr. Serov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Chikin (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Makhonin

¶25. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text